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Does metaphysics, or does it not, need ontological levels? Should 
metaphysics endorse the thesis that things of some kinds are onto-
logically more fundamental than things of some other kinds? Must it 
be a datum of metaphysics that entities of certain kinds are ontologi-
cally grounded in entities of certain other kinds? Must it be a feature 
of any adequate metaphysical theory that it awards a special ontologi-
cal status to entities of certain kinds and denies this special status to 
entities of other kinds?
There are two ways to approach these questions (or this ques-
tion — for the four questions I have asked are essentially the same 
question). I’ll call them, tendentiously perhaps, the Bad Way and the 
Good Way. This is the Bad Way:
Begin by giving examples of pairs of things that supposedly oc-
cupy different ontological levels (or one of which is ontologically 
more fundamental than the other or one of which is ontologically 
grounded in the other or one of which enjoys a special ontological 
status denied to the other). Proceed to use these examples as in-
tuition pumps in the service of an affirmative answer to our ques-
tion. Alternatively, play the other side of the game: insist that the 
default answer to our question is No, and dispute the examples 
that your opponents say support an affirmative answer — deny 
the existence of some of the entities that figure in the examples, 
or deny that there is any reason to suppose that the members of 
any of the pairs do occupy different ontological levels. (And simi-
larly for the other formulations of the question.)
1 This paper is the text of the second of two LanCog Lectures in Metaphysics, 
which were presented at the University of Lisbon on 12 and 14 June, 2013.
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And this is the Good Way:
Let metaphysicians who accept the idea of ontological levels con-
struct theories that incorporate that idea. Let metaphysicians 
who reject the idea of ontological levels construct theories that 
do not incorporate that idea. Once these things have been done 
— of course they will be done only if they are possible, only if it 
is possible to construct theories of both sorts — compare all the 
theories that our metaphysicians have constructed and determine 
which is the best. (I say ‘is’ for the sake of simplicity; in this pa-
per, I’ll use ‘metaphysical theory’ to mean something fairly com-
prehensive, something like a metaphysical system — something 
sufficiently comprehensive that any two “metaphysical theories” 
will be incompatible with each other. Thus, platonic realism and 
presentism are not metaphysical theories in the present compre-
hensive sense; but any metaphysical theory must in some way 
incorporate a theory of universals and a theory of time.) And — 
again, for no better reason than my desire to keep the sentences 
I have to write as simple as possible — I’ll ignore the possibility 
of two metaphysical theories tying for first place in the goodness 
sweepstakes.)  And, finally, affirm the reality of ontological levels 
only if ontological levels figure in the best metaphysical theory. 
(And similarly for the other formulations of the question.)
Granted, to become a follower of the Good Way is to commit one-
self to finding a way to decide which metaphysical theory is the best 
one. But that would seem to be a problem that we metaphysicians are 
going to have somehow to deal with simply in virtue of being meta-
physicians. (At the very least, most metaphysicians will concede that 
there are in metaphysics positions worthy of being called theories, 
and most metaphysicians will regard some of these theories as being 
in some sense better than some of the others.)
And, of course, we do know of some ways to compare the 
strengths and drawbacks of at least some pairs of metaphysical theo-
ries. I’ll give an example of the kind of thing I mean. I intend in 
this paper to present parts of a metaphysical theory (not to defend 
it; rather it will serve as an illustration of a theory that, as my title 
implies, dispenses with ontological levels). Suppose that I were to set 
out to compare this metaphysical theory with some theory of the gen-
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eral kind endorsed by Jonathan Schaffer in his important recent paper 
“On What Grounds What.”2 I find it easy to predict the items that 
would figure in a debate between Schaffer and me about the relative 
merits of the two theories. For his part, he would say that my theory 
rests on an unworkable conception of metaphysics and that it con-
tains a disguised but essential appeal to grounding. And I would give 
reasons in support of my conviction that his theory is vitiated by its 
failure to distinguish between sentences and propositions (a distinc-
tion that is pedantic in many philosophical contexts, but crucial in 
the context that Schaffer’s subject-matter has placed him in). I would 
give reasons in support of my conviction that his theory — the parts 
of it that have any meaning at all — incorporates, explicitly or tacitly, 
various theses that are simply false. For example — this is one of his 
tacit theses —, the thesis that the existence questions that are com-
monly disputed in metaphysics are best understood as questions about 
whether certain proper and common nouns that have a firm place 
in our everyday or scientific or philosophical discourse — ‘God’, 
‘Sherlock Holmes’, ‘property’, ‘number’, ‘mereological sum’— have 
(whichever is appropriate) referents or non-empty extensions.
It will, of course, be controversial whether any given theory re-
ally does have any of the features that I have imagined Shaffer and me 
ascribing to each other’s theories, but I doubt whether there are many 
philosophers who would deny that the following features constitute 
defects in such theories as may have them: resting on an unworkable 
conception of metaphysics; making a disguised but essential appeal 
to a thesis such that the inventors of the theory formulated it with 
the specific intention that it should not commit its adherents to that 
thesis; failure to observe a crucial distinction; depending essentially 
on vocabulary that means nothing at all; incorporating false theses. 
So — the Good Way tells us — to determine whether metaphysics 
needs ontological levels, examine proposed theories, not supposed 
cases: examine (on the one hand) theories that imply that there are 
indeed things that occupy distinct ontological levels, and (on the oth-
er) theories that imply either that the very concept of an ontological 
2 Included in David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman (eds.) 
Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), pp. 347–383).
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level is in some way defective or that there is only one ontological 
level. Compare these theories in respect of matters like the incor-
poration of meaningless or false statements, having unnoticed entail-
ments that demonstrably unfit them for the metaphysical work their 
authors intended them to do, and so on. (One will of course want to 
consider the virtues as well as the vices of the theories in question — 
but I refrain from naming any theoretical virtues because it is hard, 
very hard indeed, to find plausible and non-trivial examples of theo-
retical virtues that can be described in the brief compass appropriate 
to an illustrative example.) The Good Way tells us that the only real 
argument for the existence of pairs of things that occupy distinct on-
tological levels, the only argument worth paying attention to, is this: 
a theory according to which there are such pairs emerges from this 
dialectic as clearly superior to all theories according to which there 
are not. And, of course, the Good Way tells us the same thing, mu-
tatis mutandis, about arguments for the non-existence of such pairs.
You have no doubt inferred, and inferred correctly, that my ad-
vice to those who try to answer the “levels” question is to follow the 
Good Way. If you are comfortable with the idea of metaphysical in-
tuitions (I’m not, not really, but you may be), my advice could be put 
like this: Apply your metaphysical intuitions to carefully stated and 
well-worked-out and very general theories, not to particular exam-
ples or individual cases. Examples can, of course, figure in the com-
parison of theories: one can compare the ways in which rival theories 
deal with particular examples. But don’t first — before considering 
any theory — decide what to think about some range of examples, 
and then use the set of conclusions you have reached by considering 
each case individually as a fixed store of data to draw on when you 
are evaluating competing metaphysical theories.
My purpose in this paper is simply to give an outline of the meta-
physical theory I favor — or, at any rate, of the part of this theory 
that is particularly relevant to the question of ontological levels: the 
ontology I favor. It will emerge that there is no place in this ontology 
for the concept of ontological levels or for the designation of certain 
entities as ontologically fundamental or for ontological grounding or 
for a special ontological status that is enjoyed by some of but not all 
the entities it recognizes. I do not suppose that the fact that this one 
ontology has no place for ontological levels is any sort of argument 
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for the conclusion that metaphysics does not need ontological levels. 
An argument for that conclusion — the Good Way tells us — would 
have to consist in a comparison of all the ontologies that do not in-
corporate the idea of ontological levels (presumably, mine is not the 
only one) with the competing ontologies that do. Before any such 
comparative evaluation can be carried out, however, we must have 
the competing ontologies on the table. This paper is intended only to 
accomplish one part of that preliminary undertaking — to put one 
theory on to the table and to formulate it in a way that brings the fact 
that there is no place in it for the concept of an ontological level into 
sharp focus.
The theory that I propose to put on to the table is not the theory 
of material beings that I presented in the book of that name. If I were 
to write a systematic Summa Metaphysica in ten chapters, my theory of 
the metaphysics of the physical world would be presented in Chapter 
9 or thereabouts. Earlier chapters, those in roughly the middle of the 
book, would be devoted to topics like realism versus idealism and 
the nature of space and time. Earlier still would be the chapters on 
cosmology and creation (or, more generally, on the question ‘Why 
is there anything at all?’). The ontology that I am going to lay out in 
this essay would occupy the second chapter of the book. (The first 
chapter would contain (a) an analysis of being and existence, and (b) 
a development of the concept of an ontological category — a concept 
that I shall use without explanation in the present essay, and (c) an 
account of the nature of ontological disputes — disputes about, e.g., 
the existence of universals or temporal parts or mereological sums. 
The first chapter would be, in a word, an essay in what I have called 
“meta-ontology.” And the meta-ontological position defended in that 
essay would be, in many respects but not all, Quine’s position. In 
the present essay, I will presuppose a Quinean understanding of ex-
istence and being and the proper method to employ in resolving dis-
putes about what there is.)
Although, as I say, the theory that I am going to “put on to the 
table” is not the metaphysic of the physical world that was set out in 
Material Beings, I take just a moment to insist — vehemently — that 
that metaphysic does not in any way involve the idea of a plurality 
of ontological levels. I remind you that my metaphysic of physical 
things does not imply that electrons inhabit a more fundamental level 
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of being than that occupied by chairs. For that to be the case, there 
would have to be a level of being occupied by chairs, and for that to 
be the case, there would have to be chairs. And there are no chairs. 
Nor does that metaphysic imply that electrons and mice inhabit dif-
ferent ontological levels: electrons have no proper parts (so they say), 
and mice have proper parts (whatever Aristotle may have supposed), 
but an electron and a mouse are both equally “there,” and the two 
phrases ‘has no proper parts’ and ‘has proper parts’ are not — at 
least so far as I can see — phrases that even seem to be, that so much 
as represent themselves as, names of ontological levels.
While we are on the topic of the physical world, I will note par-
enthetically that there is a clear and useful causal sense in which one 
physical entity can be more fundamental than another: an entity x is 
more fundamental than an entity y if x can exist in a wider range of 
physical regimes than y. For example, a proton is more fundamental 
than a sparrow because a proton can exist in every circumstance in 
which a sparrow can exist and can also exist in the center of a star 
(an environment hostile to sparrows). A quark is by the same to-
ken more fundamental than a proton because quarks exist wherever 
protons exist and once existed when protons could not yet exist: in 
the quark-gluon soup of the Very Early Universe. It seems evident, 
however, this use of the word ‘fundamental’ is entirely unrelated to 
the use of the word in current metaphysics.
Let us then turn to the metaphysic, the ontology, that I am put-
ting on the table. The first thing to say about this theory — the con-
tent of the second chapter of my imaginary Summa Metaphysica — is 
that it is, if I may so express myself, radically platonistic. I will try to 
explain what this slogan means.
According to this ontology — let us call it the Favored Ontology 
—, the things that there are may be exhaustively divided into two 
broad categories. One of them is a category that I am willing to call 
by any of three names: the category of universals; the category of 
abstract objects; the category of relations. (I so use the term ‘rela-
tion’ that propositions count as 0-term relations, and qualities, prop-
erties, or attributes as 1-term or unary/monadic relations. Binary/
dyadic and ternary/triadic — and so on — relations I call “proper” 
relations, a class that also includes variably polyadic relations.) I do 
not regard these three names as equivalent in meaning. I indeed say 
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that the classes “universal,” “abstract object” and “relation” are identi-
cal, but when I say this I mean to be expressing a substantive meta-
physical thesis. In, the sequel I will use the term “abstract object” to 
refer the members of this category, but the choice is more or less ar-
bitrary and I do not mean it to imply that I regard the term ‘abstract 
object’ as a name for this category that is in any way more important 
or more, well, fundamental or than either ‘universal’ or  ‘relation’.
Abstract objects, I contend, exist independently of human lan-
guage and human thought. For that matter, they exist independently 
of divine thought. Each of them in fact exists independently of ev-
erything — or, at any rate, of everything else, everything besides it-
self. Each of them is, I maintain, a necessarily existent entity: the 
population of abstract objects is the same in every possible world. 
In particular, they exist independently of the contingent things that 
they are potentially about, are potentially features of, and potentially 
relate. The proposition that George Bernard Shaw was credulous, 
for example, exists in all possible worlds, even though Shaw himself 
exists in hardly any of them. The attribute credulity likewise exists 
in all possible worlds, even if (as I’m inclined to suppose) credulous 
beings like those whose multitudinous existence is such a deplorable 
feature of the actual world are to be found in only a minuscule pro-
portion of logical space.
Abstract objects are, moreover, radically anetiological. That is to 
say, it is not possible that they should act on other things (they lack 
causal powers) and it is not possible that they should be acted on by 
other things (they are impassible). An abstract object can, of meta-
physical necessity, be neither agent nor patient. (Read that statement 
de dicto or de re, as you will; it’s true either way.) This point applies 
equally to those abstract objects that are causal powers. The attri-
bute “carries unit negative charge” (an attribute of all electrons) is a 
causal power, but it has no causal powers. (It’s things like electrons 
that have causal powers — causal powers such as carrying unit nega-
tive charge.) And it is not only the case that all abstract objects are 
anetiological; it is also the case that only abstract objects are anetio-
logical. Other possible names for the category “abstract object” are, 
therefore, ‘anetiological object’ and ‘non-causal thing’.
Abstract objects are, finally, non-spatio-temporal. The idea of a 
location either in space or in time has no application to them. One 
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important consequence of this thesis is that it makes no sense to say 
that a property is located (or wholly located) where its instances are.
The other “high” category of things, the other primary ontologi-
cal category, is the category “concrete object.” Like the category 
“abstract object,” this category has more than one name, and it is a 
substantive metaphysical thesis that these names — which are not 
equivalent in meaning and none of which is more important or more 
fundamental than any of the others — are all names for one cat-
egory. Other names for the category of concrete objects are: “sub-
stance,” “impredicable,” “individual thing” or “particular thing,” and 
“agent” (or “etiological object” or “causal thing”). (“Patient” may also 
be a name for this category. Whether a metaphysician supposed that 
it was would depend on whether that metaphysician believed, with 
Aristotle and St Thomas, that there was one rather special substance 
whose nature was incompatible with patiency.)
I understand the word ‘substance’ in either of two senses: ‘thing 
that cannot be predicated of things’ and ‘thing that exists “on its own” 
or “in its own right”’ — that is a thing that is not a mode or mere 
modification of some other thing; a thing that does not “inhere in” 
some other thing; a thing that is not an “ontological parasite.” (Ob-
viously, Aristotelian universals, if such there be, are not substances 
in the second sense, but then no one would have supposed that they 
were, since they are not individual things. And equally obviously, in-
dividual accidents or tropes are not substances — but, again, no one 
would have supposed that they were. Holes and wrinkles are a more 
interesting case: if there are such things as holes in pieces of cheese 
and wrinkles in carpets, they are not substances — not even if they 
are space-occupying, contingently existing individual things that 
endure through time and have causal powers.) These are two dis-
tinct meanings that the word ‘substance’ might have. I contend only 
that the class of things that are substances in either sense is identical 
with the class of things that are substances in the other. (According 
to the Favored Ontology, there are no ontological parasites. This is 
presumably a necessary condition for this ontology’s serving as an 
illustration of an ontology that has no place in it for fundamentality 
or ontological levels — for it seems obvious that being an ontologi-
cal parasite would be sufficient for being a non-fundamental thing. I 
would, however, insist that a philosopher who did believe that there 
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were ontological parasites should deny that they were substances.)
The category “concrete object” includes such items as shoes and 
ships and bits of sealing wax and cabbages and kings. (That is, it in-
cludes such things as these if there are such things — and if, as I sup-
pose, Spinoza is wrong and these things are not mere finite modes of 
the one substance. Whether there are such things as shoes and ships 
and the rest of that lot is a question that must be referred to the final 
chapters of the Summa Metaphysica. At any rate, all such physical or 
material things as there are belong to this category. And such imma-
terial or non-physical or non-spatial or supernatural things as there 
may be belong to it as well, provided that they have causal powers: 
Cartesian egos, angels, Babylonian deities, God, ... . God, I will re-
mark, must belong to this category — if he exists — simply in virtue 
of the fact that he has causal powers. He is a concrete thing even if, 
as some theists suppose, he exists necessarily, and even if, as some 
theists suppose, it is metaphysically impossible for anything to act on 
or affect him, and even if, as some theists suppose, he has no sort of 
location in either space or time.)
It follows from what we have said about abstract objects that they 
can in no possible sense of the word be constituents of concrete ob-
jects. Thus, the Favored Ontology agrees with “austere nominal-
ism” on one important point: concrete objects have no “ontological 
structure.” They are what Armstrong has called “blobs.” The only 
constituents of concrete objects are their proper parts (parts in the 
strict and mereological sense): “smaller” concrete objects. For exam-
ple, the only constituents ships have (if ships there are) are concrete 
things: masts and rudders and planks, perhaps, or steel plates and 
nails and rivets and molecules and atoms and elementary particles.
I of course recognize the fact that many metaphysicians contend 
that there are things of kinds that cannot, or cannot obviously, be 
thought of as sub-categories (or subclasses or sub-anythings) of either 
of the two categories I have delineated — or, for that matter, as sub-
classes of their union, overlapping both. We may cite:
•	 facts and states of affairs
•	 states (as in “mental state” and “physical state”) 
•	 physical quantities: masses, charges, forces,...
•	 immanent universals
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•	 kinds (natural or otherwise): species, genera, taxa
•	 tropes or individual accidents or property instances
•	 bare particulars or substrates
•	 mathematical entities: sets, numbers, vectors, functions, 
operators ...
•	 events (or changes) and processes
•	 moments and intervals of time
•	 spatial points and lines and regions
•	 points in and regions of space-time
•	 stuffs and quantities of stuff: water; the water in this glass
•	 “derivative entities” or “ontological parasites” or “modes of 
substance”: holes, cavities or hollows, surfaces, waves, shad-
ows, reflections ...
•	 mental/perceptual/intentional entities (other than imma-
terial mental substances like Cartesian egos): pains, qualia, 
sensations, sense data, thoughts, episodes of reasoning, the 
witch that Hob thought had blighted his crop ...
•	 linguistic entities: word-tokens, sentence-types, questions, 
tenses, languages ...
•	 social entities: married couples, universities, football teams, 
political parties, religions, nations ...
The fact that it is hard — and may in some cases be impossible — to 
find a place for entities of these kinds in the Favored Ontology should 
not be taken to entail that that ontology has any implications, any im-
plications whatever, in the matter of whether any sentences spoken in 
the ordinary business of life express true or false propositions. I take 
the ontology I propose in no way to imply that any of the following sen-
tences cannot express truths when uttered in everyday circumstances 
in which their utterance would be conversationally appropriate:
There are several well-known facts that the Senator chose to 
overlook in her speech
For any solid object in the shape of regular cone and for any units 
of linear measure [yards, nanometers, light-years ...], there are 
real numbers x and y such that (a) the circumference of that ob-
ject at its base is x units to four significant decimal places, and its 
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height is y units to four significant decimal places, and (b) its vol-
ume is x2y/37.6991 cubic units to four significant decimal places
There are exactly as many one-centimeter holes in this board as 
there are one-centimeter wooden dowels in the enclosed packet
When speakers of Portuguese utter Portuguese declarative sen-
tences in the ordinary business of life, they very often thereby say 
true things.
In my view a successful defense of the Favored Ontology would in-
clude ways of providing paraphrases of those natural-language sen-
tences that both express truths and appear to involve reference to or 
quantification over things that are neither propositions, properties, 
relations, nor substances in such a way that the paraphrases (a) either 
express the same propositions as the originals or at least — as it 
were — can serve the same purposes as the originals, and (b) involve 
reference to and quantification only over propositions, properties, 
relations, and substances.
I might, for example, in attempting to provide such paraphrases 
say that states of affairs are just exactly propositions (the states of 
affairs that obtain being true propositions and the states of affairs 
that do not obtain being false propositions), and I might say that facts 
are simply states of affairs that obtain — that is, true propositions. I 
might first paraphrase all sentences that are couched in the standard 
vocabulary of applied mathematics as sentences whose only specifi-
cally mathematical vocabulary comprises the two predicates ‘is a set’ 
and ‘is a member of’ — and then go on to rewrite all the result-
ing sentences as sentences whose variables range not over sets but 
over properties, using the formal techniques Russell employed in his 
“no class” theory. I might identify kinds with their “corresponding” 
properties: that is, I might, e.g., identify the kind “horse” with the 
property equinity or horsehood. I might attempt to interpret all dis-
course apparently about social entities as discourse about people and 
various propositions they accept or have undertaken to bring about 
the truth of and various relations in which they stand to one another; 
I might, e.g, attempt to interpret discourse about religions as dis-
course about people and various theological propositions and various 
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relations like the variably polyadic relation expressed by ‘the xs are 
co-religionists’.
Now one might well ask, Why just those two categories? Why 
not none — that is, why not dispense with the concept “ontological 
category” altogether? Or, if you are going to make use of that con-
cept, why not just one of those two? And why not other categories — 
whether or not those other categories are employed in conjunction 
with one or both of the categories “abstract object” and “concrete 
object”?
My answer to the question ‘Why not none?’ would depend on my 
analysis of the concept “ontological category,” and that is not a task I 
am prepared to undertake in within the confines of this essay.
If the question is, Why not only one of your two categories?, this 
question will make sense only if that “one” is the category “concrete 
object” — for it is obviously an absurd thesis that there are only 
abstract objects: if there are only abstract objects, what are we and 
what is “all this” (imagine that I have spoken those words aloud and 
have accompanied them with a gesture obviously intended to indi-
cate “all around I see”)? I am of course aware that there are ontolo-
gies according to which everything is a “property.” There is Laurie 
Paul’s ontology, for example, or James Van Cleve’s “New Bundle 
Theory” (invented by him, but not endorsed by him). But the “prop-
erties” that are the members of the sole category endorsed by such 
theories cannot be what I am calling “properties” — since they, or 
some of them, can be present in various regions of space and since 
they, or some of them, can enter into causal relations (some of them 
are visible, for example).
Suppose the question is, Why does your ontology include abstract 
objects? Why not only concrete particulars? Why not only substanc-
es? Why are you not a nominalist? I have answered this question else-
where: I should very much like to be a nominalist, but I can’t see my 
way clear to being a nominalist. I can’t see my way clear to being a 
nominalist because I don’t like contradicting myself, and I find that I 
can’t get along in the world without saying things that imply the ex-
istence of abstract objects — or at least they seem to me to have that 
implication, and I can find no very convincing reason to suppose that 
that seeming is mere seeming. But this confessional statement raises 
large questions that I cannot address here.
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Why, then, do I not employ other categories? Why does my ontol-
ogy not include states of affairs — states of affairs that are not propo-
sitions but are rather the truth-makers for propositions? Why does it 
not include states — mental states and physical states, conceived as 
things that have causal powers? Why, for God’s sake, does it not in-
clude events? And so on and so on.
To this series of questions there is a long answer and a short an-
swer. To present the long answer I should have to write a book or at 
any rate a monograph. I choose to present only the short answer. It 
can, I hope, be given in the form of an example — followed by an 
attempt to generalize the moral of that example. The example is this: 
I will try to explain why my ontology does not include events.
Let us consider one of those pokers that were apparently an invari-
able adjunct to life in the rooms of Trinity College a century ago. The 
poker is cold; it is placed in the fire and becomes hot. That is to say, 
a certain substance, the poker, acquires a certain property, the prop-
erty “being hot.” Why not say that the poker’s acquisition of the prop-
erty “being hot” entails the existence of a third item (an item identical 
with neither the poker nor the property “being hot”), an item denoted 
by the very words I have used: ‘the poker’s acquisition of the property 
“being hot”’? And, of course, if the description ‘the poker’s acquisi-
tion of the property “being hot”’ denotes something, what it denotes 
is a certain event, a certain change in the way things are.
I have imagined that I have been asked the question, “Why not say 
that there are events?” But the ghost of Occam is whispering another 
question in my ear: Why say that there are events? Why multiply en-
tities beyond necessity? Now you may want to tell me that to affirm 
the existence of events is not to “postulate” them — any more than 
to affirm the existence of Scotsmen or camels or historians of medi-
eval philosophy is to postulate something. We already believe in the 
existence of events, you may want to tell me: earthquakes and lov-
ers’ trysts and traffic accidents are items in everyone’s ontology. And 
if we do allow the term ‘postulate’ (I imagine your continuing), in 
postulating the existence of events, we’re hardly postulating beyond 
necessity: we can’t say what we need to say without referring to and 
quantifying over events.
These questions are not easily answered in a brief compass. I will 
attempt to answer only the second, and I cannot devote to it the 
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space that it deserves. I say that to affirm the existence of events, 
whether you call it postulating or not, is to affirm the existence of 
items one doesn’t need to affirm, since it is possible to paraphrase all 
sentences that involve reference to and quantification over events as 
sentences that involve only reference to and quantification over sub-
stances and properties. (And, I contend, these paraphrases will be 
workable substitutes — but for length and complexity — for their 
originals, whether those originals figured in scientific explanations, 
in philosophical arguments, or in the conduct of the ordinary busi-
ness of life.) I cannot defend this thesis here: my purpose in stating it 
is only to point out that it is the thesis I am putting forward when I 
say that it is not necessary to affirm the existence of events.
You may reply that the argument is insufficient. After all, in that 
wonderful ironic fragment called “Ontological Misogyny,” Alonzo 
Church showed how to paraphrase away all reference to and quanti-
fication over women. And yet women exist: they inhabit the realm 
of being in serene indifference to Church’s splendid logical tour de 
force.3 And, for all logic can tell us, it may well be that there are 
events despite the fact (if fact it is) that it is possible to eliminate 
quantification over events from our discourse. What logic can tell 
us is the following: If Olivia the ontologist — whose taste for desert 
landscapes has led her to embrace the proposition that she inhab-
its an event-free world — has a way of paraphrasing those of the 
sentences she wishes to utter that apparently imply the existence of 
events (Olivia, of course, holds that this appearance is mere appear-
ance) in such a way that the sentences her method yields do not even 
apparently imply the existence of events, then she is in a position to 
say practically useful everyday things like ‘The commission’s report 
contains a detailed description of the sequence of events that led up 
to the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere’ and to say 
theoretically useful metaphysical things like ‘There are no events’ 
and, nevertheless, to avoid (perhaps) contradiction, and (certainly) 
the appearance of contradiction.
3 “Ontological Misogyny” (also known as “The Ontological Status of Women 
and Abstract Entities”) is available at several places on line. Two of them are 
http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/church.htm and http://cs.nyu.edu/piper-
mail/fom/2005-September/009079.html.
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I can, moreover, cite a more important motivation than a mere 
love of ontological parsimony for refusing to affirm the existence 
of events. It is this. It is not at all clear to me that it is possible to 
assign a complete and consistent set of properties to objects of that 
alleged kind. I take it to be obvious, a mere matter of logic, that 
everything has, for any property, either that property or its comple-
ment. In other words, any meaningful question about either objects 
of a certain kind or about any given object of that kind must have an 
answer. And it seems to me that if there are events, there are many 
clearly meaningful questions that can be asked about them (general 
questions, questions about the category “event” and questions about 
the supposed referents of certain singular descriptions that purport 
to denote events) that have no answers. It may be that a theory of 
events would answer certain of these questions. For example: Can an 
event recur?, or What is the relation between, e.g., the object called 
“the poker’s becoming hot at noon” and the poker? (The poker must 
in some sense be a “constituent” of the poker’s becoming hot at noon 
— but what, precisely, is this “constituency”?) I am less sanguine 
about the possibility of answering questions like those posed in the 
following example.
Consider a certain gradual acquisition of the property “being hot” 
by the poker in McTaggart’s study, an event that occurred in the 
morning of on March 11th, 1905; to be more precise, it started 
at 9:03 a.m. and went on till 9:09 a.m. Here’re some questions 
about that event. Could it have happened earlier or later? — and, 
if so, how much earlier or how much later? Could it have hap-
pened over a longer or shorter period of time? And here’re some 
more questions about it. The poker, on that occasion, reached a 
maximum	temperature	of	487˚	C;	would	 it still have occurred 
if the poker had reached a significantly higher temperature, or if 
it had reached only a significantly lower one? Only certain parts 
of	the	poker	reached	487˚	C;	suppose	it	was	other	parts	of	the	
poker that had reached that temperature. Would it nevertheless 
have occurred?
I cannot show that there could not be a marvelous theory of events 
that implied that all these questions had answers, but I would ask why 
one should bother to try to find or construct such a theory, however 
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marvelous, if apparent reference to and apparent quantification over 
events can be eliminated from our discourse. Why should we meta-
physicians invest the precious and severely limited time that is given 
to us for serious metaphysical thinking in an attempt to find answers 
to intransigent questions if we can make the questions go away?
I think it is important to note that an appeal to ontological levels 
or grounding or ontologically fundamentality does nothing to enable 
us to resolve these questions (to answer them or to deal with them 
in any other way — for example, to dismiss them as meaningless or 
somehow illegitimate). Suppose we assume that certain entities — 
substances and properties, it may be, but pick any entities you like — 
are ontologically fundamental and that events, although there indeed 
are events, are not among these ontologically fundamental entities. 
That is to say, assume, that events are ontologically grounded in the 
fundamental entities, that their existence and their properties and 
the relations they stand in to one another and to the fundamental 
entities are all somehow “automatically generated” by the existence 
of and the properties of and the relations that hold among the fun-
damental entities. Still, events exist. They’re really there. Apparent 
reference to and quantification over them is not mere appearance. 
They do not, as it were, disappear when the sentences that appar-
ently imply their existence are subjected to careful logical or onto-
logical analysis. And that means, as I have said, that each of them has, 
for every property, either that property or its complement. And that 
implies that all the questions I have asked must have answers. This is 
the moral of my example, the moral I promised to generalize.
And the generalization is obvious: it is a defect in a metaphysi-
cal theory if it affirms the existence of things that raise questions 
that have no answers. And it is a prima facie defect in a metaphysical 
theory if it affirms the existence of things that raise questions such 
that those who espouse the theory are at a loss to provide answers to 
them. And that is why I have chosen substances and relations as the 
only entities whose existence my theory affirms. I do not mean to 
imply that I can solve all the problems that these entities raise — or 
all the questions that must by answered by the metaphysician who 
affirms the existence of substances and relations and nothing else.4 
4 There are three problems in this area that I know of no fully satisfactory 
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I can say only that:
(a) I don’t think that substances and relations can be dispensed with; 
I don’t see how to “paraphrase away” the apparent reference to and 
quantification over substances and relations that is a pervasive fea-
ture of our everyday and philosophical and scientific discourse. I 
think, therefore, that such problems as are raised by substances and 
relations are unavoidable.
(b) I do think that all the other entities of the sorts whose existence 
might be affirmed by a metaphysician writing, in my trope, Chapter 
2 of a Summa Metaphysica (i) raise intransigent questions comparable 
with those I raised in my brief discussion of events, and (ii) can be 
dispensed with. If I do not in every case know how to do this (see n. 
3), I am willing to include in my “research program” the search for 
techniques of paraphrase that will enable us to dispense with the en-
tities whose “dispensability” is still problematical. I regard the prob-
lem of finding suitable techniques of paraphrase as tractable.
(c) There is no place for the concept of entities that occupy different 
ontological levels in a metaphysical theory that affirms the existence 
of only of substances and abstract objects (understood in the “radi-
cally platonistic” sense endorsed by the Favored Ontology). And, 
therefore, there is no place in such a metaphysical theory for the con-
cept of entities that are ontologically grounded in other entities or 
the concept of entities that are ontological fundamental. Substances 
are not grounded in abstract objects, and abstract objects are not 
solution to.(i) It looks for all the world as if (given that there are properties at all 
— given that there are unary or monadic relations) when one says — and, surely, 
this is true? — “The property ‘wisdom’ is not one of its own properties,” one is 
ascribing the property expressed by the open sentence ‘x is not one of the proper-
ties of x’ to wisdom. But, as Russell has taught us, if there is such a property it has 
itself if and only if it does not have itself. (ii) I do not know how to find logically 
satisfactory systematic names for certain relations — such as asymmetrical binary 
relations. (For a discussion of this problem, see my essay, “Names for Relations,” 
Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 20: Metaphysics (2006) pp. 453-477.) (iii) I am 
not sure how to represent quantification over places and times within the con-
fines of the Favored Ontology.
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grounded in substances. Nor are some substances grounded in other 
substances or some abstract objects grounded in other abstract ob-
jects — not, at any rate, in any sense of “grounded in” that at all 
resembles the sense in which, e.g., the set that contains Socrates and 
nothing else — a standard example of an entity that is said to be 
grounded in an entity of another sort — , is said to by those who use 
this example to be grounded in Socrates. Substances and abstract 
objects, moreover, do not occupy different ontological levels. They 
belong to radically different ontological categories, yes, but there is 
nothing that could be meant by saying that one of these categories 
was more fundamental than the other. Nor do any two substances 
occupy different ontological levels5. Nor, finally, do any two abstract 
objects occupy different ontological levels.
Anyone who accepts the theory I have outlined (the Favored Ontol-
ogy) has thereby “dispensed with ontological levels.” As I have said, 
this fact by no means constitutes an argument for the conclusion that 
metaphysicians should reject the concept of objects that occupy dis-
tinct ontological levels. An argument for that conclusion could (as I 
have said) emerge only in the course of a systematic and comprehen-
sive comparison of, on the one hand, the defects and merits of the 
metaphysical theories that, like the Favored Ontology, do not incor-
porate the idea “ontological level,” and, on the other, the defects and 
merits of the metaphysical theories that do incorporate this idea.
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5 In my view, this statement is fully consistent with classical theism. There is 
certainly a sense in which God and creatures occupy different ontological levels, 
but it is not — it in no way resembles — the sense in which “singleton Socrates” 
and Socrates (supposedly) occupy different ontological levels.
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